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Distinctions, judgment, and reasoning in classical Chinese thought  
Abstract 
The paper proposes an account of the prevailing classical Chinese conception of reasoning 
and argumentation that grounds it in a semantic theory and epistemology centered on drawing 
distinctions (biàn ?) between the similar and dissimilar kinds of things that do or do not fall 
within the extension of ‘names’ (míng ?). The paper presents two novel interpretive 
hypotheses. First, for pre-Hàn Chinese thinkers, the functional role associated with the logical 
copula is filled by a general notion of similarity or sameness (tóng ?). Second, these 
thinkers’ basic explanation of reasoning is that it is a process of moving from a comparison of 
whether something is similar to a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ (fǎ ?) to a judgment about whether 
that thing is part of a certain kind (lèi ?). Classical texts treat judgment as the attitude of 
predicating a ‘name’ of something, or, equivalently, of distinguishing whether something is 
the kind of thing denoted by a certain term. Reasoning is treated as a process of considering 
how some acts of term predication, or drawing distinctions, normatively commit one to 
making further, analogous predications or drawing further, analogous distinctions. Inference 
is thus understood as the act of distinguishing something as a certain kind of thing as a result 
of having distinguished it as similar to a relevant ‘model’ or ‘standard’. The paper concludes 
by summarizing the consequences of the proposed account of early Chinese semantic and 
logical theories for the interpretation of other areas of classical Chinese thought. 
Keywords: Chinese logic, distinctions, analogical reasoning, kinds, models 
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Distinctions, judgment, and reasoning in classical Chinese thought  
CHRIS FRASER∗ 
1. Introduction 
Scholarship on Chinese logic since the first half of twentieth century has displayed a 
marked tendency to seek and emphasize equivalences between Chinese and Western logical 
concepts and theories while downplaying the distinctive features of classical Chinese logic. 
In some cases, Chinese logical concepts have been hastily equated with Western notions.1 In 
others, the basic structure of Chinese logical theory has been neglected.2 In still others, that 
structure has been addressed, but in an oddly ad hoc, incoherent way.3 Much energy has been 
 
∗ Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC.  
1 To cite only a few selected examples, Hu 1969, 93–98, interprets the later Mohist ‘Lesser Selection’ as 
explicitly introducing various forms of deductive and inductive inference. Tán 1964, 420, identifies the Mohists’ 
concept of cí ? (phrasing) with the proposition and treats their notion of shuō ? (explanation) as a three-stage 
argument, albeit one modeled on medieval Chinese Buddhist logic, not the syllogism. Chén 1996 
straightforwardly identifies the Mohist concepts of míng ? (names), cí, and shuō with the contemporary notions 
of ‘concept’, ‘proposition’, and ‘inference’. Similarly, Sūn 1994, 263, identifies míng and cí with ‘concept’ and 
‘proposition’ and holds that shuō is a ‘proof’ aimed at establishing a cí as ‘thesis’ or ‘conclusion’. Neither writer 
considers how the theoretical roles of the Chinese concepts might render such identifications problematic. 
Harbsmeier 1998 equates the Mohist concept of biàn ? (distinction-drawing) with ‘logical analysis’, an 
interpretation that generates such incongruous consequences as his statement that for the Mohists, ‘The aim of 
logical analysis was to establish a correct description of the world’ (331)—as if they took ‘logical analysis’ to be 
an empirical field of study. Zhang and Liu 2007, 88, equate the role of the Mohist notion of fǎ ? (models) in 
naming with that of essence in Aristotle’s account and identify inference by comparison with fǎ as a form of 
deduction (94), when in fact such inferences are typically analogical. 
2 Harbsmeier 1998 entirely omits discussion of the four core techniques identified in the Mohist ‘Lesser 
Selection’ (see section 7 below) or their theoretical significance. Zhang and Liu 2007 survey various logical 
notions from different parts of the Mohist corpus while making no attempt to examine how these might fit 
together into a unified framework.  
3 Graham 1978 and 1989 present an elaborate, systematic interpretation of later Mohist semantics and logic, yet 
Graham’s controversial view that the later Mohist texts are organized according to a fourfold division of 
knowledge prompts him to claim that the single word biàn refers to two distinct fields in different parts of the 
Mòzǐ. On Graham’s account, in the later Mohist canons, biàn is part of ‘disputation’, the study of names and 
relations between names, which yields a priori, logically necessary judgments based on analysis of the 
definitions of names. By contrast, in the ‘Lesser Selection’, he claims it is part of ‘description’, the study of 
relations between names and objects, which yields knowledge that is contingent and transient. His account thus 
splits into at least two fields what for the Mohists appears to have been a single theory of biàn, incorporating 
semantics and rudimentary principles of logic and rhetoric and applicable to any area in which discussion or 
debate might arise as to whether something is x or not, where ‘x’ is any term. Besides raising a puzzle as to why 
the Mohists would use a single label for two discrete fields, Graham’s proposed distinction between 
‘description’ and ‘disputation’ collapses as soon as we observe that canons such as A74 and B35, which he 
claims concern ‘disputation’, are clearly also concerned with ‘description’, since they treat the issue of which of 
two opposing terms fits an object, and also that some canons addressing name-object relations (such as A78) 
employ the same notion of ‘necessity’ (bì ?) that he associates with ‘disputation’. For an overview of criticisms 
of Graham’s approach, see Fraser 2003. For detailed critiques, see Harbsmeier 1980, Geaney 1999, and Chong 
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devoted to demonstrating that classical Chinese thinkers indeed ‘were logical’ or possessed 
the same logical concepts as the classical Greeks, such as the laws of excluded middle or 
non-contradiction, or as modern logic, such as quantifiers or conditionals.4 Such projects 
sometimes appear motivated by dubious premises, such as that it would possible for speakers 
of an interpretable language to somehow be ‘non-logical’ or to apply a ‘special logic’5 or that 
Western thought presents normative standards that Chinese thought must meet lest it be 
judged somehow inadequate.  
Expressions of such logical laws can surely be found in the later Mohist dialectical 
texts, sometimes as direct statements, sometimes as indirect assumptions.6 But what is 
especially notable about the Mohists’ treatment is that—unlike in Aristotle, for example—
neither such laws nor other principles of deductive logic—whether sentential or term logic—
are explicitly thematized. They are simply not the focus of theoretical attention. Instead, the 
focus is on biàn ?, a concept that, despite previous scholarly attention,7 remains 
insufficiently articulated.  
Classical or pre-Hàn (prior to 206 BCE) Chinese texts univocally refer to processes of 
reasoning, argumentation, and debate or disputation as biàn (roughly, ‘distinguishing’ or 
 
1999. (For convenience, references to the later Mohist texts will be given using the numbering system in 
Graham 1978.) 
4 See, e.g., Cheng 1965, Paul 1993, Sūn 1994, Harbsmeier 1998, and Zhang and Liu 2007. 
5 Hansen 1983 incisively critiques both the bizarre yet once common view that Chinese thought is ‘non-logical’ 
or incommensurable with familiar patterns of inference and the equally misguided view that the empirical study 
of implicit reasoning patterns in Chinese texts demonstrates that early Chinese thinkers shared the concepts and 
theories of ancient or modern Western logic. The former view is exemplified in Bodde 1939 and Nakamura 
1960, the latter in Chmielewski 1962 and Cheng 1965. Hansen rightly makes the Quinean-Davidsonian 
conceptual and methodological point that users of a language could not systematically fail to follow basic rules 
of logic without thereby rendering themselves unintelligible. At the same time, however, that these users 
conform to basic norms of logic by no means entails that the concepts and theories by which they articulate and 
explain those norms will coincide with familiar Western ones.  
6 Explanations A73–74, for instance, clearly express some version of the principle of excluded middle and 
employ a principle of non-contradiction, although their conception of these principles probably addresses the 
semantics of terms, rather than the truth of statements.  
7 Several previous studies have explored the significance of biàn, including, for instance, Graham 1978, Hansen 
1983, Zhang 1996, Chong 1999, Fraser 2009a, Robins 2010, and Fraser 2012. Chong 1999 presents a 
particularly judicious and instructive evaluation of competing interpretations.   
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‘distinction drawing’) or biàn shuō ?? (distinguishing and ‘explaining’ or ‘persuading’).8 
Biàn plays a role partly comparable to dialectics in Greek thought, but perhaps even more 
central and wide-ranging. The notion of biàn stands at the heart of early Chinese conceptions 
of many cognitive activities. Interpreted narrowly, as ‘distinguishing’, biàn is the core 
process in sense perception.9 It is also the process we engage in when we carefully evaluate a 
claim or think through a difficult problem.10 It is an important object of knowledge,11 through 
which it guides action. It is the crux of what we do whenever we argue, dispute, or reason 
with each other. Indeed, it seems to be regarded as the core or fundamental cognitive 
operation (Xúnzǐ 22/13–21), and the opening lines of the Mohist ‘Lesser Selection’ depict it 
as effectively the basis for all intellectual activity (Mòzǐ, 45/1-2). The various uses or aspects 
of biàn give the notion a set of conceptual roles roughly overlapping those of recognition, 
evaluation, judgment, reasoning, and debate.  
The purpose of this paper is to give the concept of biàn a fuller characterization than 
previously available and to show how it stands at the center of the conceptual framework of 
classical, or pre-Hàn (479–206 BCE), Chinese thought, influencing the structure of fields as 
diverse as semantics and ethics. Specifically, the paper will explain how, for classical 
Chinese thinkers, biàn functions as a fundamental theoretical concept in semantic theory, 
epistemology, and logic or the theory of argumentation. Prevailing classical Chinese theories 
in fields we might categorize as semantics, epistemology, psychology, and logic or rhetoric 
 
8 Occasionally the texts instead use the partly synonymous term yì ?. See, among many possible examples, 
Xúnzǐ 18/102 or The Annals of Lü Buwei 4.5 or 7.5. Citations to Xúnzǐ give chapter and line numbers in the 
Harvard-Yenching concordance to Xúnzǐ, which can be conveniently accessed at http://ctext.org/. Citations to 
the Annals (also available at http://ctext.org) give the standard section numbers, as in Knoblock and Riegel 2000. 
Note that for the purposes of this paper I use the terms ‘classical’ and ‘early’ to refer to Chinese texts from the 
pre-Hàn or Warring States era, from roughly 479 to 206 BCE. All translations from the Chinese are my own.  
9 See Xúnzǐ 22/12–21. For a detailed discussion of the role of discrimination in early Chinese theories of sense 
perception, see Geaney 2002.  
10 See, e.g., Mòzǐ 35/5–10. Citations to Mòzǐ give chapter and line numbers in the Harvard-Yenching 
concordance to Mòzǐ, accessible at http://ctext.org/.  
11 See, e.g., Mòzǐ 17/12, Zhuāngzǐ 2/70. Citations to Zhuāngzǐ give chapter and line numbers in the Harvard-
Yenching concordance to Zhuāngzǐ, also accessible at http://ctext.org/. 
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all seem to be structured largely around the idea that the basic cognitive operation is that of 
distinguishing similar from dissimilar kinds of things, typically by comparison with a model 
or standard of the kind in question. This operation is the crux of biàn. For expository 
purposes, we can think of biàn (distinction drawing) as the central node of a web of concepts 
that includes similarity (tóng ?) and difference (yì ?), kinds (lèi ?), models (fǎ ?), and 
various types of inference. Its place in this web makes it the core explanatory notion 
underlying mainstream early Chinese theories about language, knowledge, and cognition. An 
alternative way of capturing its centrality is to say that early Chinese theorists regard 
perception, cognition, reasoning, and argumentation as all based on pattern recognition—that 
is, the practical ability to distinguish and respond to relevantly similar stimuli in a similar, 
normatively correct way—and pattern recognition is an apt description of the outcome of 
biàn. To expand slightly, pre-Hàn theorists see cognition, reasoning, and logic as based on 
norms governing the semantics of terms; they explain the semantics of terms by appeal to 
their proper use; and they explain the use of terms by appeal to the ability to distinguish 
similar from different kinds of things according to public norms. This is the general outlook 
that drives mainstream theories such as those of the Mohists and Xúnzǐ, and it is the 
prevailing view against which critics such as the Zhuāngzǐ writers react when they question 
whether there is any universal or unchanging basis for drawing distinctions.12  
The paper presents two novel interpretive hypotheses that follow from this account of 
biàn. First, section 5 will propose that for early Chinese texts that treat language and logic, 
the functional role associated with the logical copula is filled by a general notion of similarity 
or sameness (tóng). Specifically, for the later Mohists, the classical Chinese thinkers who 
devote the most attention to language and logic, the significance of an assertion that we 
 
12 See, for instance, the arguments in such texts as Zhuāngzǐ, Book 2, “Discourse on Evening Things Out” and 
Book 17, “Autumn Waters.”  
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would interpret as stating that ‘F is G’ is in effect that F is ‘the same’ as G in one of several 
relevant ways that things can be similar. Evaluating the truth of such an assertion is 
understood as a process of distinguishing whether F and G are indeed ‘the same’. Second, 
section 7 will suggest that the Mohists’ and other classical theorists’ basic explanation of 
reasoning is that it is a process of moving from a comparison of whether something is similar 
to a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ (fǎ) to a judgment about whether that thing is part of a certain kind. 
Classical texts treat judgment as the attitude of predicating a ‘name’ of something, or, 
equivalently, of distinguishing whether something is the kind of thing denoted by a certain 
term. Reasoning is treated as a process of considering how some acts of term predication, or 
drawing distinctions, normatively commit one to making further, analogous predications or 
drawing further, analogous distinctions. Inference is thus understood as the act of 
distinguishing something as a certain kind of thing on the basis of having distinguished it as 
similar to a relevant ‘model’ or ‘standard’.  
 
2. Biàn ?  
As a first step toward supporting these generalizations, we can examine prominent 
uses of the concept of biàn in classical Chinese texts. Early texts employ the word biàn 
(usually written ?, but sometimes ?) in a number of interrelated ways, which seem to stem 
from three overlapping basic meanings. The core uses of the word seem to be as a verb 
referring to the act of distinguishing or discriminating things from each other and as a noun 
referring to distinctions. A second common use refers to argumentation. Here biàn is 
interpretable roughly as ‘to argue, dispute, or debate’ as a verb and ‘debate, argument, or 
disputation’ as a noun. A third, less salient use is as an adjective describing people or actions 
that are intelligent, clever, or skilled. The latter two uses of biàn can plausibly be explained 
as extensions of the core sense, and they probably retain the basic connotation of 
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distinguishing, dividing, and discriminating. For pre-Hàn thinkers, a debate or an argument is 
in effect an activity aimed at drawing distinctions. The adjectival use of biàn implies a 
conception of intelligence, cleverness, or wits as competence in distinguishing or 
discriminating things incisively and correctly. An illuminating English interpretation for biàn 
in this sense might be ‘discriminating’, as when we speak of discriminating taste or 
discriminating intelligence.  
The conceptual ties between the three uses help to explain why pre-Hàn texts 
frequently use the graph ‘?’ interchangeably with ‘?’. In modern Chinese, these graphs 
express two distinct homonyms: biàn ? refers specifically to distinguishing or distinctions, 
biàn ? to argument or debate. By contrast, pre-Hàn texts do not regularly distinguish these 
words graphically. A likely explanation is that, besides sharing the same pronunciation, the 
two graphs were conceptually so deeply intertwined that they were considered alternate ways 
of writing a single word, which referred both to drawing distinctions and to the process of 
discussing or debating how to draw distinctions. 
In the following subsections, I will make a few observations about the first set of uses 
of biàn and then discuss the second set in more detail. The third use I will set aside without 
further comment. 
 
Biàn as ‘distinguishing’ and ‘distinctions’ 
The gist of my observations about the first set of uses is that biàn is a central 
cognitive process closely associated with early Chinese conceptions of knowledge and that its 
conceptual role overlaps extensively with our notions of evaluating and judging. When used 
as a noun referring to distinctions, biàn is often treated as an important object of knowledge, 
particularly in the Mòzǐ. For instance, the texts speak of knowing ‘the distinction between shì 
? and fēi ? and between benefit and harm’ (MZ 11/7, 35/7) or ‘the distinction between duty 
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(yì ?) and not-duty’ (17/13). Use of the word biàn as an object of zhī ? (knowing) is less 
common in other texts (although see, e.g., Zhuāngzǐ 2/70). But it is typical to find knowledge 
presented as a matter of correctly differentiating shì-fēi (what is-this versus what isn’t-this) or 
tóng-yì ?? (similar or different kinds of things). A famous passage in Mencius states that 
knowledge is ‘the heart of shì-fēi’ (6A:6, referring probably to the shì-fēi attitudes of the 
heart, which was regarded as the organ of cognition), and Xúnzǐ (2/12) explains knowledge as 
deeming shì as shì and fēi as fēi—in other words, getting shì-fēi distinctions correct. This link 
between biàn and knowing carries over when we consider the verbal use of biàn to mean 
roughly ‘to distinguish’. According to the Xúnzǐ, biàn in the sense of ‘distinguish’ is the basis 
for perceptual knowledge and semantics. Perceptual knowledge involves correctly 
distinguishing similar and different things, and names refer to things on the basis of 
distinctions between them (22/13–23). 
Used as a verb, interpretable roughly as ‘to distinguish’, biàn often plays a conceptual 
role that overlaps those of English notions such as ‘evaluate’, ‘identify’, ‘recognize’, or 
‘judge’. This suggests that for ancient Chinese thinkers, cognitive operations such as 
evaluation, recognition, and judgment are understood as processes of distinguishing and 
discriminating.13 For instance, the Mòzǐ describes its rebuttal of fatalism as an attempt to 
míng biàn ?? (clearly judge or evaluate) the fatalists’ claims (35/5–6). The Mencius  refers 
to accepting a large wage ‘without distinguishing ritual and duty’ (????)—that is, 
without evaluating or judging whether accepting such remuneration in a particular situation 
 
13 Hansen 1983, 125, is thus correct to insist that ‘the core sense of “discriminate” still undergirds the analysis’ 
of biàn throughout the Mohist dialectical texts. He is also correct that biàn sometimes refers to, in his words, 
‘immediate judgments—like perceptual judgments’ (120–21) and that it ‘seems to lie at the base’ of all other 
‘linguistic activities’ (126). However, as we will see below, in the same passage he is probably mistaken to 
claim that biàn ‘are not viewed as the conclusions of a process of reasoning’. That biàn is importantly distinct 
from deductive or formally valid inference does not entail that it is not a kind of argument or does not comprise 
a ‘process of reasoning’ yielding ‘conclusions’ of some kind. Although in some cases biàn might refer to a 
direct, immediate judgment, in others it might involve an explicit process of reasoning.  
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accords with the guidelines of ritual and morality (6A:10). Similar uses of biàn occur in 
Xúnzǐ (e.g., 8/37), The Annals of Lü Buwei (e.g., 12.3), and Zhōngyōng ?? (sect. 22).  
 
Biàn as disputation or argument 
In the second group of uses, biàn refers to disputation and is the main term for debate, 
argument, or discussion in early Chinese texts. The texts describe biàn in this sense at several 
levels of generality. The most general set of descriptions depicts it as the overall process of 
cognitive evaluation, reasoning, and judgment that stands at the heart of all intellectual 
activity and is (partly) the basis for descriptive or propositional knowledge. A second set of 
descriptions depicts biàn as a dialectical, apparently competitive, argumentative activity, a 
kind of debate or dispute between two parties or contending views. A third, much more 
specific set of descriptions presents biàn as a process of disputing whether some term does or 
does not fit some thing—that is, whether or not that object is part of the extension of the term.  
The crucial observation to make about the two more general descriptions is that they 
both involve distinguishing whether things are shì-fēi (this versus not-this) or tóng-yì (same 
versus different). The relation between the three types of descriptions, then, is probably that 
biàn in the narrow sense of disputing whether a term does or does not fit a thing is the core 
constitutive activity of biàn in the two more general senses.14 Biàn in the general sense of 
discussion or disputation is in effect just an extended process of biàn in the narrow sense of 
disputing whether to predicate a term of something, in which both sides make assertions that 
function as inferential grounds for their claim that a term does or does not fit.15 Biàn in the 
sense of evaluation and judgment is the aim or outcome of this activity. 
To illustrate these points, we can look at how biàn is explained in the Mohist 
 
14 As Hansen 1983, 120, observes, biàn is fundamentally ‘the fixing of distinctions for naming and judgment’.  
15 Chong 1999, 17, is thus correct that biàn has ‘both inferential and descriptive aspects’.  
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Dialectics and the Xúnzǐ, the two classical texts that discuss the concept in the most detail. 
The opening lines of the later Mohist Xiǎoqǔ ?? (‘Lesser Selection’) essay offer a general 
description of biàn as an extremely wide-ranging activity of inquiry and judgment.  
?????????????????????????????????
????????????????? 
??????????????????????? 
Biàn—by it we clarify divisions between shì and fēi to examine the guidelines of order 
and disorder; clarify points of sameness (tóng) and difference (yì) to discern the 
patterns of míng (names) and shí (stuff, things); and settle benefit and harm to resolve 
uncertainty and doubt. Only then can we lay out what is so of the myriad things and 
sort out parallels in groups of statements.  
By means of ‘names’ (míng) we present objects, by means of phrasing (cí) we 
express thoughts, by means of explanations (shuō) we bring out reasons, and on the 
basis of kinds (lèi) we select and propose. (Mòzǐ, 45/1-2) 
This short passage presents a rich cache of information about early Chinese thought, from 
which I will highlight just a few observations. First, notice the fundamental role of biàn in 
intellectual and practical activity and the vast scope of its application. It is depicted as the 
general method of achieving understanding in virtually all areas of inquiry and practice. The 
passage suggests that biàn is the basic cognitive activity by which we guide proper conduct, 
including political activity; determine the proper relations between words and things; 
undertake inquiry, achieve knowledge, and even organize science. Specifically, it is the 
means by which we can determine ‘what is so’ of things—what terms are predicable of them, 
and thus what assertions are correct—and ‘sort out parallels’ between various types of 
statements, thus determining what relations between statements might provide good grounds 
for accepting one statement on the basis of another.16 Second, the passage clearly indicates 
that the basis for biàn, and the core activity involved in it, is drawing distinctions between shì 
versus fēi, same versus different, order versus disorder, and benefit versus harm. Third, the 
 
16 Graham 1978 is thus right to emphasize the ‘descriptive’ aspects of biàn in the ‘Lesser Selection’, although 
there is no reason to accept his claim that biàn there refers exclusively to an ‘art of description’ instead of 
disputation or argumentation. As Chong 1999 contends, it can refer to both. See too Fraser 2003. 
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overall process of biàn involves identifying certain objects or situations by using words, 
stating thoughts about these things by using ‘phrasing’ (phrases or clauses), and giving 
reasons for what we say by using ‘explanations’. So, overall, biàn involves stating thoughts 
and giving reasons for them.17 Thus there are clearly strong functional analogies between 
biàn and our concept of an argument, in which we give premises in order to support a 
conclusion, although structurally and conceptually there are also important differences 
between the two.18 Finally, the outcome or conclusion of an argument is that we make a 
judgment and assert some sentence as true. Given the functional similarity between biàn and 
an argument, then, it would seem to follow that in the Chinese theoretical scheme, the 
functional equivalent of asserting a sentence is drawing a distinction and thereby applying a 
term to something.  
If we look to the Xúnzǐ, our second chief source for classical theories about language 
and logic, we find both a similar broad application of biàn and also a similar narrow, concrete 
function. On the one hand, Xúnzǐ makes it clear that the overall purpose of biàn is to rectify 
the sociopolitical disorder caused by improper use of language, including faulty assertions, 
and to express dào, clarify social ranks and roles, and facilitate the completion of practical 
affairs. But more specifically and concretely, for Xúnzǐ the point of biàn is to rectify the use 
of names. Its ultimate purpose is to settle what terms are applied to what things and thus 
enable authorities to guide subordinates precisely in following the dào.  
???????????????????????????????? ??
 
17 In this respect, the interpretation in Tán 1964 of biàn as a series of sentences that state claims and provide 
reasons for them is defensible, although his identification of biàn with the syllogism or Buddhist yīnmíng ?? 
logic is not. As Chong 1999 observes, biàn typically include an inference preceded by a description that fixes a 
kind, not by the mediation of a middle term.  
18 We can thus acknowledge Hansen’s point that biàn does not refer to an argument ‘in the sense of proof’ (1983, 
120), while still agreeing with Chong that biàn may often involve reasoning and that it is typically ‘an activity 
of justifying a claim by giving reasons’ (1999, 15)—an activity we can defensibly characterize as giving an 
argument for a conclusion. The notion of biàn is not linked to an explicit concept of deductive consequence or 
strict logical necessity. But it is linked to various types of informal reasoning, typically analogical, in which 
some claims are offered as inferential grounds for others.  
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????????????????????????? ?… ???????
????????????????????????????????(??) 
Now the sage-kings are gone, the world is in disorder, and licentious statements arise. 
The gentleman lacks a powerful position from which to oversee them and lacks 
punishments with which to prohibit them. So he engages in biàn-shuō (distinction-
drawing and persuasion). If stuff [that is, the things referred to] is not communicated, 
we name things. [That is, we stipulate names corresponding to the things referred to.] 
If naming does not enable us to communicate, then we try to reach agreement on what 
we’re referring to. If reaching agreement on what we’re referring to does not enable 
us to communicate, then we engage in explanation (shuō). If explanation does not 
enable us to communicate, we engage in distinction-drawing (biàn).… As to biàn-
shuō, without deviating from the proper relation between stuff and names, we use it to 
communicate the dào of action and inaction. Agreement in naming things is the 
function of biàn-shuō. Biàn-shuō is the heart’s [means of] representing the dào.  
The Mohist Dialectics gives a complementary, more precise explanation of the narrow, 
specific sense of biàn. The text explains it as ‘contending over converses’, such as ‘ox’ and 
‘not-ox’, to determine which of two such converse terms is predicable of something—which 
term fits the thing.  
?????????????? 
???(?)?????????????????… (A74) 
Canon: Biàn is contending over converses. Winning in biàn is fitting the thing.  
Explanation: One calls it ‘ox’, the other calls it ‘non-ox’. This is contending over 
converses.  
???… ??????????????????????????????
?????????? 
Explanation: …One calls it ‘ox’, the other calls it ‘horse’, and both fail to win—this is 
not biàn. As to biàn, one calls it shì, the other calls it fēi, and the one that fits wins. 
(B35) 
So biàn amounts to a dispute concerning the application of two opposing terms, exactly one 
of which must fit the object. As the Mohists explain it, in biàn we debate not whether a 
particular sentence is true, but whether, with respect to some term, some object is shì or fēi—
whether the term applies to that thing.19 
To us, of course, the act of applying a term to something, as described in these 
 
19 The Mohists also treat cases in which, for various reasons, a biàn is not well formed, such that the object 
under consideration might be claimed to be both shì and fēi. For a discussion, see Fraser 2007.  
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passages, is a speech act with the pragmatic force of an assertion. Such assertions are what 
contemporary philosophers such as Quine and Davidson have called ‘one-word sentences’. 
The text makes this clear, because the descriptions it gives of the act of applying a term are 
the functional equivalent of de re ascriptions of attitudes analogous to beliefs. These 
descriptions identify some object and then report what ‘name’ or ‘phrase’ a speaker asserts of 
it or what attitude the speaker holds about it. Classical Chinese writers express such 
ascriptions by the formulas ‘wèi zhī  ??’ (‘call it’) or ‘yǐ wéi ??’ (‘take it as’). The object 
in question is first specified by the person (or text) making the ascription, who then goes on 
to state what the speaker making the assertion deems that object to be—what term the 
speaker predicates of it. The speaker’s speech act itself may involve uttering only a single 
word, but the description of that act combines a subject and a predicate, producing a complete 
judgment or assertion.20  
So we can say, then, that biàn is functionally analogous to a debate over which of two 
contradictory assertions, such as ‘This is an ox’ and ‘This is not an ox’, is true. But it is 
crucial to notice that this is not the way ancient Chinese theorists themselves conceive of the 
matter. To them, what we think of as a judgment or assertion is the act of distinguishing 
something as a certain kind of thing and accordingly applying a predicate term to it (or 
withholding the term, as the case may be). Indeed, it is not difficult to see how they can 
employ the notion of biàn, or distinction drawing, in this way to explain all types of 
assertions, not only noun predication. For in Classical Chinese, a verb phrase—a logical 
term—can stand alone as a grammatical sentence, and any sentence can be nominalized to 
become a term simply by adding shì or fēi to its head. In the theoretical framework of 
classical Chinese thought, then, what we regard as the act of evaluating the truth or falsity of 
an assertion could in every case be construed as the act of distinguishing, with respect to 
 
20 On this topic, see also the more detailed treatment in Fraser 2012. 
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some contextually identified term, whether an object or situation at hand is either shì or fēi.  
 
The role of biàn in early Chinese society 
Biàn in the broad sense of a rhetorical contest between two parties arguing for 
different, opposing ways of drawing some distinction appears to have been the primary form 
of public discussion, debate, or persuasion in classical China. Competitive biàn often took 
place in the court of a regional lord or a state sovereign. These events appear to have been 
rooted partly in the practice of litigation and partly in the rhetoric used by court advisors in 
the ‘persuasions’ (shuō) through which they tried to influence political policy. Like much 
legal argumentation, such biàn often took the form of citing a precedent, analogy, or model 
(fǎ) and explaining why the case at hand should be treated similarly or not.21 Focusing as they 
did on distinguishing cases that either did or did not fall within the extension of a certain kind, 
biàn-debates naturally tended to take the form of analogical argumentation. 
Biàn as public debate or disputation could be pursued for a variety of ends, some 
extolled by ancient writers, some condemned. Constructively, it could be a means of 
clarifying and defending the right way (dào). Through it, one could lead others to distinguish 
shì-fēi correctly and thus obtain knowledge. Of biàn in this sense, Xúnzǐ says that ‘the 
gentleman must engage in biàn’ (Xúnzǐ 5/42, 5/53) and The Annals of Lü Buwei remarks that 
in the course of study, one must occasionally engage in ‘disputation and persuasion’ (biàn 
shuō) in order to expound the dào (4.3). This would also be the sense in which Mencius 
explains that he has no choice but to engage in disputation, since as a follower of the sages he 
must attempt to rectify people’s hearts and refute the pernicious sayings of Yáng Zhū and Mò 
Dí (3B:9). 
 
21 Cua 1985 was among the first scholars to point out the similarities between Chinese biàn and legal reasoning. 
See also Garrett 1993 and Harbsmeier 1998. 
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But biàn could also degenerate into a superficial game of trying to outtalk the 
opponent, an idle contest of wits aimed at defending sophistries, or even a simple quarrel. 
This side of biàn explains Mencius’s chagrined response when told he has a reputation for 
being ‘fond of biàn’ (3B:9). Early texts are uniformly disparaging about such empty or 
flippant biàn. The Annals of Lü Buwei complains that ‘those in the world who study engage 
in much biàn. Their statements are facile and phrasings are upside-down. They don’t seek the 
facts. They strive to demolish each other, with victory as their [sole] purpose’ (15.8). The 
Zhuāngzǐ  ‘Under Heaven’ essay says that biàn zhě ???‘those who biàn’, a phrase 
interpretable as ‘dialecticians’ or ‘disputers’—‘exaggerate people’s hearts and change 
people’s intentions. They can defeat people’s mouths, but cannot persuade their hearts’ 
(33/79). It complains that Huì Shī, a famously skilled biàn zhě, ‘took opposing people as the 
substance of his activity and desired to make a name for himself by defeating people; that’s 
why he couldn’t get along with everyone’ (33/83). In his account of the ‘six schools’, Sīmǎ 
Qiān complains that the ‘School of Names’—various figures associated with the biàn zhě—
‘determine things only by names and neglect people’s feelings’. They twist words so that 
‘people cannot get back to the thought’ they were trying to express.22 Practitioners of this sort 
of antagonistic or frivolous biàn cared only for victory, even at the cost of distorting the 
opponent’s point, and they defended bizarre claims such as that ‘chickens have three legs’ 
without regard for the facts.23 
The constructive and the detrimental aspects of biàn are helpfully contrasted in this 
excerpt from a 3rd-century B.C. text preserved in several later sources: 
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
 
22 See the remarks on the míng jiā ?? in Shǐ Jì 130. Text available at http://ctext.org/shiji/tai-shi-gong-zi-xu. 
23 For an extensive discussion of the significance of public biàn and the activities of the biàn zhě, see Fraser 
2005.  
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??????????????????? 
Those who biàn separate distinct kinds so that they don’t interfere with each other and 
arrange different starting-points so that they don’t confuse each other. They express 
intentions, communicate what they’re referring to, and clarify what they’re talking 
about. They make it so that others share their knowledge and don’t strive to perplex 
each other. So the winner doesn’t lose what he defends, and the loser gains what he’s 
seeking. If done this way, then biàn is admissible. When it comes to complicating 
phrases to falsify each other’s words, embellishing phrases to pervert what each other 
says, and giving trick analogies to twist the other’s point, they stretch the other’s 
words so there’s no way to get to his thought. If done like this, biàn interferes with the 
Great Dào. Engaging in tangled debates and competing to see who’s last to quit can’t 
but be harmful to a gentleman.24  
Of particular interest are the details of the positive description in the first half of the passage. 
Ideally, participants in biàn should seek to clearly distinguish distinct kinds (lèi) of things and 
different bases or ‘starting points’ for using a term.25 Keeping these distinctions straight, they 
clarify the assertions they are making and the things they are referring to and through this 
process jointly obtain knowledge. The key to this approach to knowledge is keeping?
distinctions clear and correct. Conversely, in the harmful style of biàn, opponents distort and 
twist each other’s words, making them come out false or inconsistent or extending them in 
unintended ways. They obfuscate the differences between kinds of things and uses of words, 
offering flippant arguments for bizarre assertions to achieve victory at all costs. (The ‘White 
Horse Discourse’ of Gōngsūn Lóng ??? is probably an example of this style of 
disputation, as it consists of frivolous arguments for the obviously false claim that white 
horses are not horses.26)  
While explaining the notoriety of some early Chinese dialecticians, such as Gōngsūn 
Lóng, the passage also links their activities to mainstream Chinese philosophy of language, 
 
24 These remarks, attributed to Zōu Yǎn ??, are quoted in Liú Xiàng’s Bié Lù ??, among other sources. See 
Sīmǎ 1959, 2370.  
25 A ‘starting point’ or ‘tip’ (duān ?) is the basis for a distinct way of using a general term. As Xúnzǐ explains, 
‘honor’ has two ‘starting points’, honor with respect to moral standing and honor with respect to social status. A 
person can be morally honorable while having low social status or socially honored while being morally 
disgraceful. See Knoblock 1994, section 18.9. 
26 For a detailed discussion, see Fraser 2005, section 6.  
  18 
epistemology, and logic. As we will see below, ancient Chinese semantic theories explained 
the use of general terms, and thus communication, by speakers’ ability to distinguish (biàn) 
things or stuff (shí ?) as of the same or different kinds (lèi) and to apply the same name 
(míng) to all stuff of a kind. Cognition or judgment is treated as the attitude of distinguishing 
an object as being of the kind denoted by some term. Knowledge is a reliable ability to draw 
distinctions correctly, manifested by an ability to apply terms correctly. Reasoning is a 
process of analogical extension, taking distinctions already drawn as a basis for 
distinguishing further things as ‘the same’ or ‘different’ (tóng vs. yì), ‘this’ or ‘not-this’ (shì 
vs. fēi), ‘so’ or ‘not-so’ (rán ? vs. bù rán ??). Thus semantics, knowledge, and reasoning 
are all seen as grounded in a process of distinguishing similar from different kinds of 
things—that is, biàn in the narrow sense of distinction-drawing, the core component activity 
of biàn in the broader sense of disputation. The sections that follow sketch the links between 
biàn in the narrow sense and these other areas.  
 
3. Shuō  ?  
Before moving on to discuss semantics and argumentation, let me say a few words 
about the concept of shuō (explanation or persuasion), which we have seen mentioned in both 
the Mohist Dialectics and the Xúnzǐ. The Xúnzǐ typically uses ‘biàn-shuō’ ???as a 
compound noun, implying that ‘disputation-and-explanation’ are a single activity, perhaps 
with two stages or two coordinate parts. According to one remark, biàn (disputation) without 
shuō (explanation) amounts to mere quarreling (4/4). One particularly informative discussion 
locates shuō among a series of four interrelated discursive activities leading up to biàn 
(22/36–41). The first is naming things (mìng ?), by which we attempt to communicate them 
to others. If explicitly naming what we are talking about does not enable us to communicate, 
we move on to a second step, seeking agreement (qí ?) in specifying precisely what objects 
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we are talking about. If these steps fail to secure communication, we move on to shuō, here 
presumably explaining why we distinguish the objects as taking a certain name. If shuō too is 
unsuccessful—probably because one interlocutor rejects the other’s explanation—we move 
on to biàn and try to settle the issue by debating how to draw the relevant distinctions. (Xúnzǐ 
seems to assume that successful communication requires that both sides agree about what is 
stated.) The text explains that the function of biàn-shuō is to reach agreement on which 
names apply to which objects. Shuō is probably the part of this overall discursive process in 
which we explain our reasons for drawing naming distinctions one way rather than another.  
The remarks from the Mohist ‘Lesser Selection’ quoted above treat shuō as an aspect 
or a component of biàn devoted to ‘bringing out reasons’. Moreover, the Mohist Dialectics 
treats shuō in one of a series of passages that appear to be preliminaries to its characterization 
of biàn.27 This suggests that shuō is a component of the preliminary process leading up to 
biàn in the narrow sense of a judgment about how to distinguish things. Thus biàn in the 
broad sense (‘debate’) probably includes shuō as a component; shuō presents grounds for 
drawing distinctions one way or another and so supports and explains biàn in the narrow 
sense (‘distinguish’). The Xúnzǐ often speaks of the two as a single process probably because 
ideally the dialectical process of biàn should always include shuō: in discussing how to 
distinguish something, we should explain our reasons.  
Incorporated into biàn in this way, shuō is in effect the process of explaining reasons 
for distinguishing something as shì or fēi. It is thus similar to stating the premises of an 
argument, except that early Chinese sources recognize no standard or typical form or 
structure for a shuō nor place any constraints on the completeness of its content. So shuō is 
not a syllogism or proof. Nor is it an argument, strictly speaking, insofar as it comprises only 
reasons (gù ?) and not a conclusion. Often a shuō is simply one or more examples or models 
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relevant to the case at hand. Sometimes it comprises other, inferentially related terms or 
distinctions that can be used as criteria for drawing the distinction in question. Sometimes it 
may be a conditional statement that can be used for an inference similar to modus ponens or 
modus tollens. In a well-known Zhuāngzǐ story about a wheelwright who considers 
statements in ancient books mere ‘dregs and sediments’ of dead men, shuō is simply any 
explanation or account that supports the speaker’s assertions (13/71–72).  
 
4. Distinguishing shì-fēi: semantic theory 
If the foregoing account is correct, then the outcome of biàn is to distinguish or 
recognize something as a certain kind of thing, denoted by a certain term.28 That is, biàn is a 
process of judging whether some thing or situation F is the kind of thing properly denoted by 
the term G. This process is a form of pattern recognition, and in fact it is the same basic 
model that early Chinese thinkers use to explain perceptual recognition.29 
Whether or not this sort of distinction-drawing judgment is correct will thus be 
determined by whatever determines when a term is used correctly—an issue that falls under 
the rubric of semantic theory or theory of meaning. This is an interesting connection, because 
the semantic theories of the Xúnzǐ and the Mohist Dialectics indeed explain communication 
and the correct use of words precisely by appeal to the concept of similarity and the ability to 
distinguish, in practice, similar from dissimilar things—again, concepts closely related to 
pattern recognition. Their shared underlying theory is that speakers use the same words of the 
same things because they have learned, through practical training, to distinguish the various 
similar things denoted by some term in the same way. Thus, according to the Mohists, when 
 
27 For instance, Canon A72 has ‘Explanations/persuasions are that by which one clarifies’ ?????. 
28 In the limiting case in which we judge whether something is or is not a certain particular, the kind in question 
could comprise only a single object. However, according to Canon A78, the Mohists probably treat names of 
particulars as proper names (in their terminology, ‘private’ or ‘personal’ names ??), which, as they put it, 
‘stay’ (?) in only one particular thing.  
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we use a word to ‘present’ (jǔ ?) or refer to something, we in effect ‘show’ the listener what 
that thing is ‘like’ (A31, B53). The thing is similar to paradigms of the kind of thing denoted 
by that word, with which the listener is already familiar. Knowing what something is ‘like’ 
(ruò ?) is all we need in order to know the thing itself (B70).30 
For example, if I refer to an object in another room as ‘table’, I am informing you that 
the object is similar to the kind of thing conventionally distinguished as a table. One way that 
the Mohists explain communication is that saying a word such as table is like pointing to a 
model table for you to see. Another explanation they give is that words are like measurement 
tools. Calling something by a word is similar to giving you its measurement; it tells you what 
the thing is like.  
??????????????????? 
??… ???????????????????????????? 
Canon: On hearing that what you don’t know is like what you know, you know both. 
Explaining by: Informing.  
Explanation: … As to names, we use what we understand to correct what we don’t 
know; we don’t use what we don’t know to cast doubt on what we understand. It’s 
like using a ruler to measure a length we don’t know. (B70) 
We can use a ruler to measure length because we know the length of the marks on the ruler 
and we see that the thing measured is the same length as the distance between two of the 
marks. Analogously, through language, we can use what listeners are familiar with to inform 
them about what they don’t know. By using a name of something, we indicate that the thing 
is relevantly similar to the other things conventionally referred to by that name. When we say 
something is ‘white’, we are indicating that it is the same color as the other things we call 
‘white’.  
So things are regarded as taking the same name because they are of the same kind, 
 
29 See Fraser 2011.  
30 For a more detailed discussion, see Fraser 2009a.  
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and they are regarded as being of the same kind because they are similar in some way. This 
interpretation is supported by both the Mohist Dialectics and the Xúnzǐ, among other texts. 
Xúnzǐ indicates that naming is based on similarities and that all similar things take the same 
name:  
…???????????????? … ????????????????
?????????? 
Then we go on to name them: If they are similar, we name them similarly; if they are 
different, we name them differently. . . . We cause it to be that different stuffs all take 
different names and do not permit confusion [in the use of the different names for 
different stuffs]. We also cause it to be that similar stuff all takes the same name. 
(Book 22, ‘Correct Names’) 
The Mohists tell us that general terms, such as mǎ ? (horse), refer to all things of the same 
lèi ? (kind), and anything similar must take the same name.  
??… ??????????????????…  
Explanation (A78): …Naming it ‘horse’ is [an example of] a kind [name]. As to 
anything like the stuff [that is, anything similar to the stuff we call ‘horse’], we must 
use this name….  
When do two or more things count as similar or ‘alike’ (ruò), such that they belong to the 
same kind and take the same name? Why are some similarities between things relevant to 
determining their kind and others not? Such questions constitute a major point of controversy 
in classical Chinese philosophy of language. Mohist Canon A86 informs us that being ‘of the 
same kind’ lies in ‘having a respect in which they’re the same’ (???????). This 
explanation seems too broad, however, as it would allow nearly any group of things with any 
shared feature to count as a kind, thus making identification of kinds highly arbitrary. The 
Mohists do specify certain general criteria for distinguishing kinds, such as ‘shape and visual 
appearance’ (NO1–2), and they explain that some things, such as a piece of wood and the 
night, are so different that they cannot be compared at all and so cannot be considered ‘of a 
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kind’ (B6).31 However, the criteria they provide are probably insufficient to adequately 
explain the basis for kind distinctions. This issue is among the chief weaknesses of later 
Mohist semantics and epistemology, but pursuing it here would take us beyond the scope of 
this paper.32 By comparison, Xúnzǐ sketches an account according to which things are 
conventionally distinguished into kinds on the basis of how they affect human sense organs, 
since the sense organs of members of the same species, he claims, discriminate things in a 
similar way (22/16).  
 
5. A hypothesis about similarity and biàn 
So far, we have been focusing on the notion of similarity in being ‘of the same kind’ 
and thus part of the extension of the same general term. However, Mohist Canons A86 and 
A87 identify four distinct types of sameness and difference that may serve as the basis for 
biàn, including, most likely, cases involving the use of singular terms. (The texts do not 
differentiate between the notions of ‘similar’ and ‘same’, using a single word, tóng ?, for 
both.) The four are: (1) Sameness in being ‘of the same kind’, discussed above. This contrasts 
with difference in the sense of two things lacking any respect in which they are similar. (2) 
Sameness in being identical or coextensive (??), as when two names refer to the same stuff 
(????). This contrasts with difference in the sense of being two distinct stuffs. (3) 
Sameness in being parts of the same unit (??), as when things are included within a single 
whole (????). This contrasts with difference in the sense of not being connected or 
attached (???). (4) Sameness in being together or united (???), as when things share 
 
31 The point of Canon B6 is that although we may apply similar predicates to them, things of utterly different 
kinds cannot be compared. Although we can speak of both a piece of wood and the night as being ‘long’, the 
length of a piece of wood cannot be compared with the length of the night. Although we can speak of both an 
aristocrat and morally fine conduct as ‘noble’, we cannot compare whether an aristocrat or an instance of 
conduct is ‘more noble’.  
32 For further discussion, see Fraser 2009a.  
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the same location (????). This contrasts with difference in the sense of not being in the 
same place (???). As Graham 2003, 335, suggests, this sense of sameness might refer to 
the relation between the hard and the white features of a hard, white stone (B37), the body 
and the cognitive functions of a living thing (A22), or the length and breadth of an object 
(B4). Different aspects or features of a single thing are considered to be ‘the same’ in this 
sense.  
This taxonomy of four types of similarity or difference prompts the following 
observation. The Mohists take the general notion of ‘sameness’ (tóng) to express at least four 
different relations: identity or coextension, part-whole relations, jointly being constituent 
features or components of something, and sharing some similar feature and thereby being ‘of 
a kind’ and part of the extension of the same general term. These relations correspond 
roughly to those of identity, part versus whole, constitution, and predication, which in 
European languages are all typically expressed using the verb to be, or the copula. We can 
say, for example, that Cicero is Tully, in the sense that he is identical with Tully; that 
Cicero’s finger is Cicero, in the sense that it is part of the whole that is Cicero; that Cicero is 
his body, in the sense that he is (partly) constituted by his body;33 and that Cicero is human, 
in the sense that he falls under the kind human and the general term ‘human’ is correctly 
predicable of him. The Mohists thus appear to be explaining all four of these types of 
assertions by appeal to their concept of sameness or similarity.  
This observation invites an intriguing hypothesis about the role of the concepts of 
similarity or ‘sameness’ (tóng) and distinction-drawing (biàn) in early Chinese semantics and 
logic. The parallel between the forms of similarity or sameness the Mohists identify and our 
 
33 Strictly speaking, an exact analogue of ‘sameness in being united’ might instead be that (for example) 
Cicero’s height and his weight are ‘the same’ in jointly being features of Cicero. But for the purposes of this 
discussion, I suggest we can extend the Mohists’ notion of ‘sameness in being united’ to incorporate the 
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use of the verb to be strongly suggests that the concept of similarity or sameness plays a 
theoretical role for classical Chinese theorists analogous to that of to be or the copula in 
European languages. My hypothesis, then, is that for the Mohists—and, I suggest, for early 
Chinese thinkers more generally, given the conceptual role of biàn in texts throughout the 
early literature—the functional roles that in Western thought have traditionally been played 
by the logical copula are filled by a loose, general concept of similarity. Thus, for them, the 
significance of a typical nominal sentence in Classical Chinese of the form ‘X Y ?’ is 
probably that X is the ‘same’ as Y. That is, they implicitly understood assertions in Classical 
Chinese that we would translate into the form ‘F is G’ as in effect claiming that F and G are 
‘the same’ in one of the several senses of ‘sameness’ specified above.34 Evaluating the truth 
of such an assertion would be understood as distinguishing (biàn) whether or not F and G are 
indeed ‘the same’ in some relevant respect. More generally, early Chinese theorists probably 
regarded assertion, judgment, and reasoning all as processes of distinguishing whether things 
are ‘the same’ or not.35 Stating a fact about the world would have been seen as a matter of 
identifying a sameness or difference, in one of the various senses of ‘sameness’. ‘White 
horses are horses’ would be interpreted as in effect claiming that white horses and horses are 
‘the same’; ‘oxen are not horses’ as claiming that oxen and horses are ‘different’. If these 
interpretive hypotheses are correct, then it is no exaggeration to say that tóng (similarity or 
sameness) and biàn (distinguishing same and different) are the core explanatory notions in 
classical Chinese philosophy of language, epistemology, and logic, and that for early Chinese 
theorists, the fundamental cognitive operation is that of distinguishing similar from dissimilar 
 
constituted object of which the ‘united’ items are features or aspects. For of course Cicero, the person, and his 
body are indeed ‘united’ and do ‘share the same location’. 
34 Of course, the copula may have other functions beyond these four, as might the rough concept of ‘sameness’. 
An obscure fragment in the ‘Greater Selection’ (Dà Qǔ ??) suggests that the Mohists may have been 
investigating further respects in which things can be similar or ‘the same’, but for the purposes of this discussion 
I will omit these details.  
35 An earlier version of this hypothesis is presented briefly in Fraser 2009a, section 6. 
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objects, in the broad sense of ‘similar’ or ‘same’ that they employ.  
 
6. Judging shì-fēi in practice 
Suppose we are wondering whether some thing F is or is not G and thus whether it is 
correct to use the term ‘G’ of it. Perhaps we have discovered an unfamiliar animal and are 
trying to determine whether it counts as an ox or not. How do we decide the issue? 
Early Chinese thinkers’ answer, as expressed in a rudimentary theory that we find in 
both the Mohist Dialectics and the Xúnzǐ, appeals to the notion of a model, paradigm, or 
criterion. We cite a model (fǎ ?) of the kind of thing denoted by the term in question. Then 
we compare whether the thing at hand is similar to the model or not. If it resembles the model, 
it is shì—that is, the thing is G. If not, then it is fēi—it is not-G. The Mohists’ stock example 
of the role of such models is artisans’ use of tools such as the compass or setsquare to 
determine whether something is round or square: 
????????????????????????????  
The wheelwright and carpenter grasp their compass and setsquare and with them 
measure square and round things in the world, saying, ‘What coincides is shì (this, 
right); what does not coincide is fēi (not-this, wrong)’. (26/41–42) 
Both the core books of the Mòzǐ and the Dialectical texts make it clear that this sort of 
comparison with models is the pivotal step in the overall process of biàn. The opening 
paragraphs of Book 35, ‘Condemning Fatalism’, explain that to biàn (distinguish as shì or fēi) 
an assertion clearly and correctly, models or standards are needed as criteria:  
?????????????????:?????????????????
??????????????????????????? 
So then how do we clearly biàn these doctrines? Our Master Mòzǐ states, We must 
establish criteria. To make statements without criteria is analogous to marking sunrise 
and sunset on a turntable. The distinctions between shì and fēi or benefit and harm 
cannot be obtained and clearly known. So statements must have the ‘three standards’.  
In this early version of the Mohist theory, the criteria of comparison for analogical judgment 
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are called ‘biǎo’ (‘standards’). In the terminology of the two later versions of the theory 
(Books 36 and 37), they are called ‘fǎ’ (models), thus making the link between biàn and fǎ 
explicit.  
Consistent with this earlier theory, the first in the series of Mohist canons leading up 
to the account of biàn in Canon A74 indicates that comparison with a model (fǎ) is the basis 
for determining whether an assertion in biàn is ‘so’ (correct) of a thing.36 
??????????(A70) 
Canon: Models are what something is like and thereby is ‘so’.37 
The later Mohist ‘Lesser Selection’ (Xiǎo Qǔ) elaborates on the role of comparison to models 
thus: 
?????????????????????????????????
?? 
Emulating is the model for deeming things [that is, deeming them shì or fēi]. What 
one emulates is the model by which one deems. So if the thing accurately emulates 
[the model], it is shì. If it does not accurately emulate it, it is fēi.  
The foregoing passages from the Mòzǐ are familiar to many scholars. What is seldom 
noticed, however, is that in a brief but invaluable comment on argumentative methodology, 
the Xúnzǐ presents a similar view:  
??????????????????????????? 
In all debate, one must first establish paradigms of correctness, only then is it 
permissible [to proceed]. If one lacks paradigms of correctness, then shì-fēi are not 
differentiated and debates are not resolved. (18/102–103) 
In other words, as a general approach to resolving debates (yì ?), Xúnzǐ proposes to proceed 
by establishing ‘paradigms’ against which to compare rival assertions in order to distinguish 
 
36 Moreover, Canons A95–96 explore the detailed application of models (fǎ) to guide biàn. For brevity, I will 
omit these details.  
37 An alternative translation might be, ‘Models are that which, a thing being like them, the thing is “so”’. 
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shì from fēi. The word interpreted here as ‘paradigm’, lóng ?,38 is used frequently 
throughout the Xúnzǐ as a verb to refer to exalting something as the highest standard to follow, 
such as the Zhōu dynasty system of rituals (9/22), and as a noun to refer to the epitome or 
apotheosis of something, such as good government (14/18). One passage treats lóng as 
parallel to the concept of fǎ (8/11), and the two can play similar roles—for instance, Xúnzǐ 
claims that in mourning, three years is the ‘paradigm’ (lóng) (19/106)—a normative claim 
equivalent to saying that three years is the ‘model’ (fǎ). Xúnzǐ contends that the ‘kingly 
regulations’ of the Zhōu dynasty are ‘the greatest paradigm in the world’, which set ‘the 
boundaries of shì and fēi’. The text goes on to posit the distinctions drawn by the Zhōu 
‘kingly regulations’ as a paradigm against which to compare a rival thinker’s teaching about 
how to apply the term ‘disgrace’ (rù ?), which Xúnzǐ considers mistaken. He holds that the 
sage-kings themselves take these distinctions as a model (fǎ) (18/111). Since the rival 
teaching is dissimilar from the model, according to Xúnzǐ, it must be rejected. The 
convergence between Xúnzǐ’s methodological remarks here, the pattern of argument he 
employs, and the Mohist account of the role of models in biàn suggests that the Mohists are 
not presenting proprietary, in-house debating techniques but articulating a common, shared 
conception of reasoning and argumentation.  
For my present purposes, this conception of how models guide judgment is significant 
in three respects. First, it illustrates how judgment is understood as an act of distinguishing 
similarities by analogical comparison with models. Second, it indicates that at the most 
concrete, fundamental level, the process of biàn is understood as one of comparing objects 
against models and distinguishing them as similar or different. Third, as I will now explain, 
the conceptual relations between models, similarity, and biàn suggest that the Mohists and 
 
38 Lóng appears here as part of the phrase lóng zhèng, interpretable roughly as the paradigm or epitome of what 
is correct or upright. Although lóng zhèng is used only a handful of times in the Xúnzǐ, the word lóng is 
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Xúnzǐ interpret not only judgment, but reasoning itself as a process of drawing distinctions on 
the basis of comparison to models.  
 
7. An early Chinese model of reasoning and argument 
As we have seen, the Mohists’ explanation of how we determine whether or not to 
predicate a general term of something is based on a form of practical analogical inference. If 
our model is G, and the thing in question is relevantly similar to the model, then we infer that 
it too counts as G. Indeed, when Canon A70 states that a model is ‘what something is like and 
thereby [ér ?] is so’, the connective ér ? (‘and thereby’) arguably expresses a type of what 
Sellars 1953 calls material inference, from deeming something similar to deeming it ‘so’.39  
A?second interpretive hypothesis I propose, then, is that the simple Mohist theory of 
predication examined above may also provide a key to understanding classical Chinese 
logical theories. Classical thinkers’ core or basic conception of reasoning, I suggest, is that it 
is a process of moving from a comparison of whether something is similar to a model or 
standard to a judgment about that thing—that is, to distinguishing it as shì or fēi.40 It is 
obvious how this simple explanation applies to analogical reasoning, since it directly 
describes an implicit analogical inference. And in support of this second interpretive 
hypothesis, we can note that arguments by analogy are by far the most common form of 
argumentation or reasoning in early Chinese texts. Of course, besides analogical arguments, 
examples of what we could construe as deductive and (non-analogical) inductive reasoning 
 
frequently used with a similar meaning.  
39 Material inferences contrast with formal inferences, in that they proceed from premises to conclusion on the 
basis of their material content, not their logical form. Familiar examples include the inferences from ‘This is 
red’ to ‘This is colored’ and from ‘It is raining’ to ‘The street will be wet’.  
40 This hypothesis was introduced in Fraser 1999 and is presented briefly in Fraser 2009a, section 7. Chong 
presents a similar view when he says that, for the later Mohists, ‘the activity of giving a standard in order to 
describe correctly is the same as the activity of giving a reason in order to defend a claim’ (1999, 11).  
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also occur in early texts.41 But when they explicitly discuss reasoning and argumentation, 
early Chinese theorists—the writers of relevant parts of the Mòzǐ core chapters, the Mohist 
Dialectics, the Xúnzǐ, and The Annals of Lü Buwei, for instance—do not seem to explicitly 
consider these other types of reasoning. I suggest that this may be because they regard all 
three types as different applications of a unified basic pattern, which is roughly the following. 
The speaker (or writer) cites or proposes a model or standard as a guide for drawing the 
distinction in question and thus deeming something G or not-G. The speaker next indicates 
how the case at hand is or is not relevantly similar to the model or standard and then asserts 
that the thing in question should be deemed or treated as G or not-G accordingly. The model 
or standard may be an example of the kind of thing under consideration or another term 
linked to G by material inference relations.42 This basic pattern seems to represent the 
dominant conception of reasoning in classical Chinese texts.   
This interpretive hypothesis is necessarily tentative, as it is a generalization from the 
limited body of pre-Hàn texts that explicitly discuss the methodology of judgment and 
inference.43 I propose it for consideration because of the potential insight it might provide 
into early Chinese rhetoric and other areas of thought. It coheres well with the 
methodological remarks we have surveyed in the Mòzǐ core chapters, the Mohist Dialectics, 
and the Xúnzǐ, as well as the general practice of argumentation as attested in these texts and 
others, such as Mencius and The Annals of Lü Buwei.44 It also explains why pre-Hàn theorists 
seem to consider all inference a matter of what, in their terminology, we can call tuī lèi ??, 
 
41 Examples of causal reasoning are also common, such as in the parts of the Mohist Dialectics devoted to 
mechanics and optics. For brevity, however, I set these aside here.  
42 Such relations articulate norms governing the use of the concepts in question, such that (for example) a 
speaker who applies a certain concept in some case is therefore also committed to applying a second concept (or 
excluded from doing so, if the relation between the concepts is one of incompatibility). 
43 It is also not intended to be exhaustive, covering every instance of reasoning in the classical literature. Such a 
broad claim would be foolhardy. 
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‘pushing’ or ‘extending’ kinds.45 The hypothesis describes a process of ‘extending’ similarity 
judgments—judging something to be part of, and thus ‘the same as’, a certain kind on the 
basis of some similarity it bears to things of that kind. Inference is seen as a process not of 
moving from the truth of one sentence to the truth of another, but of moving from one 
similarity discrimination to another. The use of the expression ‘tuī lèi’ tends to support the 
suggestion that classical thinkers regard reasoning and argumentation as fundamentally based 
on analogy or pattern recognition.  
A further major point in support of this hypothesis is that in the most detailed text 
about reasoning and argumentation we have from early China, the later Mohist ‘Lesser 
Selection’ (Xiǎo Qǔ), reasoning is indeed explained purely in terms of analogies, parallels, 
and similarity. I have already cited two short passages from the ‘Lesser Selection’ that 
support this claim. One indicates that whether an assertion should be accepted is determined 
on the basis of kind relations—that is, similarity relations (‘we select or propose on the basis 
of kinds’ ???????). The other indicates that shì-fēi judgments are decided by 
similarity to models (‘if the thing accurately copies [the model], it is shì; if it does not 
accurately copy it, it is fēi’). Still more evidence for the hypothesis comes in the sequel to 
these passages, which presents four basic argumentative techniques used in biàn.46 All are 
based on similarity judgments and analogical inference. The four are:47 (1) Giving analogies 
(pì ?), which the text explains as ‘bringing up other things and using them to clarify it’ (?
?[=?]?????). This probably refers to drawing an analogy between the case at hand 
 
44 One good illustration of the hypothesized conception of reasoning is the long series of analogy-based 
arguments in the well-known dialogue between Mencius and King Xuān in Mencius 1A:7. Another is the 
dialogue between Yǐn Wén and the King of Qí in Annals 16.8. 
45 Sources for this terminology include Mohist Canon B2, Xúnzǐ Book 22, and The Annals of of Lü Buwei, 
section 25.2. The prevalence of reasoning based on extending ‘kinds’ (lèi) is also illustrated by references to 
‘kinds’ in numerous passages in other texts, such as Mèngzǐ 1A:7 and 6A:12, for example.  
46 These techniques may have been considered methods frequently employed in the shuō (explanation) phase of 
a biàn debate.  
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and another, more familiar or easily understood one in order to clarify the basis for one’s 
assertion about the present case and thus presumably justify it. (2) ‘Parallelizing’ (móu ?), or 
drawing linguistic parallels, explained as ‘comparing phrasing and jointly proceeding’ (??
???). This technique is difficult to interpret precisely,48 but it most likely refers to any 
inference in which one affirmative assertion is used to support another on grounds of 
linguistic parallelism. To ‘parallelize’ is to make or justify an assertion on the basis of formal 
similarities—specifically, similarities in phrasing—to other assertions, as when one infers 
from ‘white horses are horses’ that ‘riding white horses is riding horses’. Here the basis for 
inference is again analogical, but the operative analogy is between the formal structure of 
assertions, not their content or the things they are about.  
Whereas analogy is based on similarities between things and ‘parallelizing’ on 
similarities in phrasing, the other two techniques, ‘pulling’ and ‘pushing’, are technically 
forms of argumentum ad hominem, grounded in similarities between the discursive 
commitments of the two opponents.49 In these techniques, the immediate basis for our 
assertion is the opponent’s commitment to a similar assertion concerning what we take to be 
a similar case. (3) ‘Pulling’ (yuán ?), or appealing to the opponent’s precedent, is glossed in 
the text as ‘saying, “you are so, how is it that I alone cannot be so?”’ (?????????
???). This seems to be a ‘defensive’ form of argumentum ad hominem, in which one 
defends an assertion by citing an analogous, precedent assertion the opponent accepts and 
challenging him to identify a dissimilarity between the present case and the precedent. (4) 
‘Pushing’ (tuī ?), or analogical extension, is explained as ‘on the grounds that what they 
 
47 For a detailed interpretation of the four techniques, see Fraser 2009a, section 7.2. For a somewhat different 
interpretation, compare Robins 2010, 262.  
48 The interpretive difficulties surrounding móu are explored in Fraser 2009a, section 7.2, and in Robins 2010.  
49 I owe this helpful characterization of the four to Robins 2010. I use the phrase ‘argumentum ad hominem’ 
here in the original, positive sense of an argument that seeks to rebut an opponent from premises the opponent 
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don’t accept is the same as what they do accept, propose it’ (?????????????
??). By contrast with ‘pulling’, this seems to be an ‘offensive’ form of argumentum ad 
hominem, in which one proposes a new assertion on the grounds that it is similar to assertions 
the opponent already accepts.  
This is not the place for a detailed interpretation or discussion of the four methods. 
For our purposes here, the key observation about them, relating back to the principle that we 
‘select and propose on the basis of kinds’, is that all are specifically procedures for analogy-
based argumentation, aimed at distinguishing similarities and differences among kinds of 
objects, situations, or assertions. All involve positing something—an object, a generally 
accepted assertion, or a prior assertoric commitment by one’s interlocutor—as a model or 
standard and then, on the basis of a purported similarity to it, drawing an inference to a new 
assertion. They are thus just the sorts of argumentative techniques that, according to the 
interpretive hypotheses I have proposed, we would expect to find the Mohists emphasizing. 
Moreover, they are the only such argument moves the ‘Lesser Selection’ presents.50 The text 
does not, for example, introduce any rhetorical methods that imply a model of argumentation 
grounded in deductive inference. This feature of Mohist logic is also explained well by our 
hypotheses.  
So far in this section, I have been discussing explicit theories and techniques of 
argumentation in early Chinese texts, which should be the key to understanding classical 
thinkers’ views of logic and reasoning. These provide the primary data for any account of 
early Chinese logic. Of course, even if pre-Hàn texts do not explicitly discuss deductive or 
non-analogical inductive inference as methods distinct from biàn and ‘model-based’ 
 
himself has introduced, not the negative, fallacious sense of attacking the person offering an argument rather 
than addressing its substance. 
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reasoning, they may still present pieces of reasoning that can be interpreted as deductive or 
inductive arguments.51 How does the proposed hypothesis concerning the prevailing 
conception of reasoning in classical China explain these? Is this explanation superior to 
alternative hypotheses, such as that the writers are implicitly applying an inchoate conception 
of reasoning similar to the syllogism, for example, or to modus ponens?  
In response to these questions, a clarification and a caveat are in order. To clarify, the 
import of the proposed hypothesis is not merely that pre-Hàn writers tend to employ ‘model-
based’ reasoning more frequently than other types of reasoning. It is that, given the prevailing 
logical theories at the time, even when these writers present what we may interpret as 
instances of, for example, deductive reasoning, they probably construe these as a matter of 
presenting models and then affirming or denying similarities. The necessary caveat is that in 
moving away from explicit remarks about logical or rhetorical method in the early sources, 
we must proceed cautiously, recognizing the limits to what we can establish. Pieces of 
informal reasoning are often open to multiple interpretations. Different readers might 
interpret the same bit of informal discourse as presenting either an analogical or a deductive 
argument, for instance. Moreover, that a piece of reasoning can be interpreted as instantiating 
a particular type of inference does not show that the reasoner possesses or is guided by a clear 
conception of that type of inference. Conversely, there may be no way to establish 
conclusively that an ancient writer is not implicitly employing a particular conception or 
theory of inference. For these reasons, in interpreting pieces of reasoning in early texts that 
appear in isolation from methodological remarks, we may be unable to confirm that the writer 
seeks to present one sort of reasoning (such as model-based reasoning) rather than another 
(such as a deductive argument). The most we can endeavor to show is that a text can be 
 
50 The text also mentions the concepts of ‘supposing’ (jiǎ ?), used to introduce counterfactual assumptions, and 
‘some’ (huò ?), used to indicate that an assertion applies to only some, not all of a thing. But these are 
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explained more simply, coherently, and comprehensively as an application of one form of 
reasoning rather than another.  
With these points in mind, let me suggest that at least some prominent examples of 
purportedly deductive arguments in early Chinese texts may be explained better by the 
hypothesis that the reasoners are working from a conception of model-based reasoning than 
by the hypothesis that they are applying an implicit conception of deductive reasoning. For 
brevity, I will examine just a pair of examples, both cited by scholars as paradigms of 
deductive reasoning in pre-Hàn sources. Consider the following passage, adduced as a 
leading example of ‘syllogistic’ reasoning in an early text (Harbsmeier 1998, 279, Cikoski 
1975, 325).  
???????????????????????????????????
????????????????  
 
In Qí there was a servant whose master got into difficulty, but the servant did not die on 
his behalf. He met an acquaintance on the road. The acquaintance said, ‘Indeed, you 
didn’t die!’ He replied, ‘It’s so. All service to others is for benefit. Dying does not 
benefit. So I didn’t die’. (Annals of Lü Buwei, 18.4) 
 
The supposed syllogism is ‘All service to others is for benefit. Dying does not benefit. So I 
didn’t die’. However, this is not actually a syllogism—nor a quasi-syllogism—and only with 
substantial rewriting can it be reformulated as one.52 Alternatively, perhaps the servant’s 
explanation could be interpreted as applying an enthemymatic version of modus tollens, in 
which he argues, in effect, that since service to another is for benefit, and death in service to 
 
presented in a separate section from the four major argumentative techniques and do not involve inferences.  
51 Harbsmeier 1998, 279ff. presents a series of examples that he interprets as deductive inferences.    
52 Harbsmeier 1998, 279, recasts the argument as ‘Everyone who serves others aims at profit for himself….If I 
commit suicide that does not aim at profit for myself….Ergo: I did not commit suicide’. The rephrasing still 
does not produce a valid syllogism. Cast in syllogistic form, the argument presumably would yield the 
conclusion ‘No dying is service’ or ‘My death is not service’, rather than ‘I didn’t die’. The servant could then 
make an additional inference from the premise that service does not require death on the master’s behalf to the 
conclusion ‘I didn’t die’.  
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another does not benefit, one does not die in service to another.53 With suitable elaboration, 
either interpretation might explain the servant’s defense of his actions, but both require 
considerable rephrasing of his remarks, which do not correspond neatly to either pattern of 
inference. By contrast, our hypothesis about model-based reasoning offers a simple, direct 
explanation of the servant’s words. He first cites the model or standard that guides his activity 
in service: ‘Service is in order to benefit’. What matches this standard, he will do; what does 
not match it, he will avoid. He points out that death does not match the standard, so he did not 
die. On this interpretation, the servant’s defense closely parallels the general form of practical 
reasoning presented at Mòzǐ 32/1–2, which proposes that we apply ‘benefiting people’ as a 
model (fǎ) for conduct and then inquire, ‘Does it benefit people? Then do it. Does it not 
benefit people? Then stop’. 
My second example has been cited as a prominent instance of modus ponens in early 
Chinese sources (Harbsmeier 1998, 285). In this passage, Confucius’s protégé Zǐ Lù seeks to 
dissuade him from accepting an offer of employment from Bì Xì, governor of the city of 
Zhōng Móu, who had supposedly betrayed the minister who appointed him. Zǐ Lù reasons as 
follows: 
??????????????????????????????????
?????????? 
Zǐ Lù said, ‘In the past I heard it from you, sir: “Regarding someone who treats those 
close to him badly, the gentleman does not get involved”. Bì Xì is using Zhōng Móu to 
revolt. Your going to him—what is to be said about it?’54  
Roughly, the purported modus ponens here is: (1) If someone treats those close to him badly, 
the gentleman does not get involved with him. (2) Bì Xì treats those close to him badly. (3) 
So you should not get involved with him. Again, however, the inference is not explicit. 
 
53 The full argument might run roughly as follows: ‘(1) In all cases, one enters service only if one benefits. (2) 
Assumption: I enter service. (3) So, by (1), I benefit. (4) If I die in service, I do not benefit. (5) So, by (3), (4), 
and modus tollens, I do not die in service’. 
54 See The Analects of Confucius, section 17.7, available at http://ctext.org.  
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Considerable rewriting is needed to produce a valid instance of modus ponens. Indeed, since 
Zǐ Lù’s ‘persuasion’ (shuō) concludes with a question, rather than an explicit conclusion, it is 
unlikely that his rhetoric here is guided by a conception of deductive inference.   
By comparison, Zǐ Lù’s reasoning aligns closely with the Mohist methodology of 
biàn, as it is plausibly interpreted as an instance of ‘pulling’ (yuán), or citing the other party’s 
precedent and challenging him to explain how the case at hand is different. Zǐ Lù cites a 
standard Confucius himself has endorsed for the conduct of the gentleman: with respect to 
someone who does ill to those near him, the gentleman stays aloof. Zǐ Lù points out that Bì 
Xì has performed actions that distinguish him as a person of this kind—thus the case at hand 
matches the standard—and asks Confucius to explain why he does not follow his own 
guideline. In idiomatic English, Zǐ Lù’s question can be rendered roughly as ‘What is to be 
said about your going to him?’ or ‘How is it that you are going to him?’ Interpreted literally, 
however, the point of his phrasing (‘???’) is to ask what Confucius’s proposed action is 
‘like’.55 Zǐ Lù distinguishes this as an action of the same kind as foolishly getting involved 
with an untrustworthy person. Since Confucius seems to disagree, Zǐ Lù challenges him to 
explain what action-kind it is similar to instead. 
As these cases illustrate, a Mohist-inspired conception of reasoning as drawing 
distinctions by comparison to models seems to explain many instances of purportedly 
deductive argumentation in early texts at least as well as, and probably better than, familiar 
conceptions of deductive reasoning. Indeed, given their conception of reasoning and 
argumentation as centered on biàn, I suggest that classical Chinese thinkers may well have 
interpreted what we see as paradigmatic forms of deductive inference such as modus ponens 
(MP) or modus tollens (MT) in terms of proposing models and comparing things with them. 
 
55 As Pulleyblank 1995, 34, explains, this construction should be interpreted causatively as ‘make it like what?’, 
yielding idiomatic translations along the lines of ‘how is one to deal with it?’  
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Within their theoretical framework, depending on the context, early Chinese theorists could 
have interpreted modus ponens (P ⊃ Q, P ∴ Q), for instance, along roughly the following 
lines: ‘P is a model or standard for Q. The case at hand is relevantly similar to P. So we 
distinguish it as Q’. Modus tollens (P ⊃ Q, ~Q ∴ ~P) they could have interpreted thus: ‘In 
deeming P, take Q as a model. The case at hand is different from Q. So we distinguish it as 
not-P’.56 When they give what we construe as deductive arguments, then, classical writers 
might still understand what they are doing as a matter of citing models, pointing out 
similarities, and drawing distinctions accordingly. Of course, unlike modus ponens, modus 
tollens, or any deductively valid argument, the resulting patterns of distinction drawing are 
not truth-preserving. Even if their ‘premises’ distinguish things correctly, their ‘conclusion’ 
might nevertheless fail to do so. However, they are not intended to be truth-preserving. Pre-
Hàn logical theorists did not employ a notion of valid inference, and indeed they rejected the 
idea that inferences based on formal structure could be invariably reliable (Hansen 1983, 
Fraser 2009a, Robins 2010). Intriguingly, in their original context, both examples of 
purportedly deductive reasoning discussed above are regarded as yielding incorrect 
conclusions. The servant’s remarks are considered a sophistical defense of a great wrong, 
which illustrate how ‘phrasings’ are inadequate for judging affairs correctly. Zǐ Lù’s 
challenge is hastily dismissed by Confucius through a series of metaphors implying that he is 
incorruptible and must accept Bì’s offer or waste his talents.  
 
8. Concluding remarks: significance for other fields  
The hypotheses I have presented bear directly on our interpretation of ancient Chinese 
 
56 Of course, these biàn-inspired reinterpretations of MP and MT are inconsistent with each other, in that they 
construe the material conditional differently. The point is that early Chinese theorists might take informal pieces 
of reasoning we interpret as MP or MT and interpret them in terms of models, similarity, and distinctions in 
different contexts in ways that are ad hoc but entirely reasonable.  
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philosophy of language and logic. Beyond this, however, since the explicit study of logic and 
argumentation in a culture tends to reflect concepts and reasoning practices employed in a 
variety of fields, the significance of these hypotheses—if they are correct—may extend to our 
interpretation of other areas of Chinese thought as well, where they may help to guide new 
interpretations or to support and explain existing ones. I will conclude by remarking on a few 
examples in which this may be the case.  
In moral psychology and action theory, a starting point for many Western theories, 
going back to the ancient Greeks, is the belief-desire model of action, typically paired with a 
syllogism-like model of practical reasoning. If early Chinese thinkers employ a distinction-
drawing model of reasoning, not a syllogistic model, we should be cautious about assuming 
that they implicitly apply a belief-desire model to treat action and practical reasoning. Instead, 
as I have proposed elsewhere (Fraser 2009b), they probably apply a ‘discrimination-and-
response’ model, in which the agent distinguishes her situation as being of one kind or 
another and then responds to it according to either brute dispositions (as when we seek what 
we desire) or norms in which she has been trained (as when we act in conformance with ritual 
propriety). Such a model also suggests that that Chinese theorists are unlikely to bifurcate 
reason from the passions or the cognitive functions from the conative. Instead, as is well 
known, they tend to associate all of these functions with a single action-guiding organ, the xīn 
? or heart-mind, which guides action by drawing shì-fēi distinctions and triggering practical 
responses. Early Chinese moral psychology thus may focus on training the agent’s overall 
ability to distinguish and respond to situations appropriately, rather than appealing to abstract 
reasoning processes or seeking to shape the agent’s affective or conative states.57 
In ethics, the hypotheses I have discussed would lead us to expect to find an emphasis 
on emulating virtuous models and general behavioral paradigms, such as ritual propriety, 
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rather than on deducing particular consequences from universal ethical principles. This is not 
to suggest that early Chinese thinkers lack a notion of higher-level, relatively abstract ethical 
standards—in some contexts, they are very obviously applying such notions, such as the 
concept of yì ? (duty) or the Mohists’ concept of benefit (lì ?). But in ethical reasoning we 
can expect to see such higher-level criteria expressed as models and applied through 
similarity comparisons, rather than stated in propositional form and applied through 
deductive inference, as in a practical syllogism.  
In epistemology, the interpretations I propose suggest that the basic conception of 
knowledge will be a practical ability, namely knowing how to distinguish and name things.58 
This form of know-how can then be used as a basis for articulating a conception of 
propositional knowledge. Also, since knowledge will be based mainly on pattern recognition, 
the early Chinese conception of knowledge is likely to emphasize the notion of reliability 
over that of explicit, propositional justification.  
The discrimination-and-response model of thought and action also makes it relatively 
unlikely that Chinese thinkers would develop representational or mentalistic conceptions of 
the mind. To them, fundamentally, performing a cognitive function properly is exercising the 
ability to perform a practical skill, such as distinguishing and naming things correctly. It is 
not a matter of holding, reflecting on, or manipulating certain sorts of mental representations. 
This point helps to explain the absence of mentalistic conceptions of action or reasoning in 
early Chinese thought and the frequent references to an ‘empty’ psychological state from 
which actions seem to issue automatically, without self-conscious thought.59 
Finally, in the philosophy of science, Chinese thinkers can be expected to regard 
 
57 For discussion of this possibility, see Fraser 2009b.  
58 I discuss this conception of knowledge further in Fraser 2011.  
59 On ‘emptiness’ and its links to action in Daoist thought, see Fraser 2008. Similar references to automatic, 
unselfconscious action are common in the Xúnzǐ, such as at 5/60–61 and 8/59–61. The distinction-drawing 
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scientific knowledge as concerned primarily with taxonomy, models, and algorithms, not 
deductive systematization. The dominant mode of explanation will be by models, analogies, 
and taxonomical description, not by deductive-nomological explanation from general laws.  
A detailed defense of these programmatic generalizations about various fields of 
classical Chinese philosophy is beyond the scope of this paper. My aim is simply to present 
them as food for thought. They do seem to me plausible and potentially fruitful, however, and 
the high degree of coherence between these generalizations—assuming they turn out to be 
accurate—and the interpretive hypotheses of this paper lends support to the latter. 
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